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This paper focuses on tenure driven productivity dynamics of a firm-worker match as 
a potential explanation of "unemployment volatility puzzle". We let new matches and 
continuing jobs differ by their productivity levels and by their sensitivity to aggregate 
productivity shocks. As a result, new matches have a higher destruction rate and 
lower, but more volatile, wages than old matches, as new hires receive technology 
associated with the latest vintage. Our contribution is to produce model driven 
stickiness of old jobs’ wages which does not rely on ad hoc assumptions on wage 
rigidity. In our model, an aggregate productivity shock generates a persistent 
productivity difference between the two types of matches, creating an incentive to 
open new productive vacancies and to destroy old matches that are temporarily less 
productive. The model produces a well behaving Beveridge curve, despite 
endogenous job destruction, and more volatile vacancies and unemployment, without 
a need to rely on differing wage setting mechanisms of new and continuing jobs. Price 
rigidities do not alter the basic mechanism and the transmission of monetary policy 
shock is very similar to the standard New Keynesian model with search frictions. 
 
Keywords: Matching, productivity shocks, job flows, Beveridge curve, vintage 
structure, nominal rigidities, monetary policy shock, tenure 
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 Non-Technical Summary
This paper focuses on tenure driven productivity dynamics of a ￿rm-worker match as a poten-
tial explanation of the "unemployment volatility puzzle". We study an economy in which new
matches and continuing jobs di⁄er in their productivity levels and in their sensitivity to aggre-
gate productivity shocks. The former feature, lower productivity in new hires, implies that new
matches have a higher destruction rate and lower wages than old matches, consistent with the
empirical evidence. The latter feature, in turn, captures the basic idea that new hires receive
productivity associated with the latest technology vintage, suggesting that young ￿rms respond
more and possibly with di⁄erent margins to business cycle shocks than do the old ones (Campbell
and Fisher, 1998).
We capture the match heterogeneity by using a vintage-type structure, where all matches
are created as "new", but eventually transit exogenously from this state to "old". New and
old matches di⁄er in two ways: First, following a long tradition of works on productivity and
job duration (or tenure), the productivity of matches is increasing with tenure, s.t. the aver-
age productivity of old matches is higher than that of new matches. This feature is typically
attributed to e.g. learning by doing, learning of match quality or selection e⁄ects (e.g. Becker
(1964), Brown (1989), Topel (1991)). Second, new matches are more responsive to aggregate
productivity ￿ uctuations than old matches. This means that positive realisations of productivity
shocks lead into a temporary but persistent productivity advantage of new jobs over old jobs,
but in the long run the aggregate shock induced productivity di⁄erences even out. This also
means that the old jobs￿wages more "sticky" with respect to new ones.1 We emphasize this
second feature as the stickiness of old jobs￿wages is model driven and does not rely on ad hoc
assumptions on wage rigidity as is common in the literature.
We show that heterogeneous productivity dynamics of new hires and continuing jobs tack-
les a number of problems in the standard matching model2. First, the model produces a well
behaving Beveridge curve despite endogenous job destruction. Second, it narrows the gap be-
tween the volatility of the model￿ s labour market variables and actual data. The well behaving
Beveridge curve is due to the fact that an aggregate productivity shock creates a temporary
productivity di⁄erence between the two types of matches. This creates an incentive to create
new productive vacancies and destroy the old matches that are temporarily less productive.3 Al-
though employment adjustment does take place through the job destruction margin, it becomes
1This feature is consistent with the idea that young plants (or ￿rms) adopt more ￿exible organisations to cope
with the greater risk and to exploit new opportunities. This suggests that young ￿rms respond more and possibly
with di⁄erent margins to business cycle shocks than do the old ones (Campbell and Fisher, 1998).
2The standard matching model has di¢ culties to match key correlations and volatility of labour market
variables and output (e.g. Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Hornstein et al. (2005), Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007a)).
In particular, the standard matching model with endogenous job destruction fails to generate a strong positive
(negative) correlation between output (unemployment) and vacancies: the Beveridge curve tends to be upward
sloping. The reason is the sensitivity of the job destruction margin to exogeneous shocks. Moreover, the standard
model fails to generate the high volatility of labour market variables observed in the data.
3A similar mechanism is present also in the recent model by Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007), where old
jobs cannot upgrade their technology in the same phase as new jobs.
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the job destruction margin towards the job creation margin. The shifting of adjustment margin
from job destruction to job creation also increases the volatility of vacancies and unemployment
and the model captures the dynamic correlations between labour market variables and output
(and unemployment) better than the standard matching model.
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New hires and continuing jobs exhibit substantially di⁄ering productivity and wage dynamics as
well as job separation behavior. Whereas it is well known that productivity and wages increase
with tenure (e.g. Brown (1989), Topel (1991) ) and that the probability of a job ending declines
with tenure (e.g. Farber 1999), the di⁄ering wage cyclicality of new hires and continuing jobs
has been the focus of attention in recent labour market matching literature. Haefke et al.
(2008) and Carneiro et al. (2008) provide evidence on the strong responsiveness of wages in
new hires to productivity ￿ uctuations, whereas wages of continuing jobs exhibit substantial
rigidity. Pissarides (2008) surveys the empirical evidence about the cyclicality of wages in new
and continuing jobs and relates the evidence to the discussion of the ￿ unemployment volatility
puzzle￿in the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model. He argues that the observed cyclicality
of wages of new matches is consistent with the Nash wage equation, which gives a proportional
relationship between wages and labour productivity, in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model.
Furthermore, he argues that given the weak empirical support for wage stickiness, plausible
explanations of the unemployment volatility puzzle should not rely on a sticky wage per se, but
should rather be consistent with the observed proportional relation between labor productivity
and wages of new matches.
This paper focuses on tenure driven productivity dynamics of a ￿rm-worker match as a
potential explanation of the "unemployment volatility puzzle". We study an economy in which
new matches and continuing jobs di⁄er in their productivity levels and in their sensitivity to
aggregate productivity shocks. The former feature, lower productivity in new hires, implies that
new matches have a higher destruction rate and lower wages than old matches, consistent with
the empirical evidence. The latter feature, in turn, captures the basic idea of Caballero and
Hammour (1998) and Campbell (1997) where new hires receive productivity associated with the
latest technology vintage, suggesting that young ￿rms respond more and possibly with di⁄erent
margins to business cycle shocks than do the old ones (Campbell and Fisher, 1998). Instead of
pursuing the path of incorporating alternative wage setting mechanisms in the matching model,
we analyze the factors that underlie the standard Nash wage equation. Our contribution to the
literature is to make old jobs￿wages more rigid than new ones, without resorting to alternative
wage setting mechanisms or ad hoc wage rigidity. In this sense, our approach is in the spirit of
Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007a) and Pissarides (2008) who conclude that a ￿ exible wage is not
the principal problem with the model and that the need for wage rigidity is overemphasized in
the literature.
In order to capture the match heterogeneity, we use a vintage-type structure, where all
matches are created as "new", but eventually transit exogenously from this state to "old". New
and old matches di⁄er in two ways: First, following a long tradition of works on productivity
and job duration (or tenure), the productivity of matches is increasing with tenure, s.t. the
average productivity of old matches is higher than that of new matches. In the literature,
increasing productivity, and thus a wage increasing in tenure is attributed to e.g. learning by
doing, learning of match quality or selection e⁄ects (e.g. Becker (1964), Brown (1989), Topel
7
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old matches, which makes the old jobs￿wages more "sticky" with respect to new ones.4 We
emphasize this second feature as the stickiness of old jobs￿wages is model driven and does not
rely on ad hoc assumptions on wage rigidity as is common in the literature.
In our model new hires obtain a temporary but persistent productivity advantage over old
jobs, but in the long run the aggregate shock induced productivity di⁄erences even out. This
captures the standard property in vintage models that new hires receive productivity associated
with the latest technology vintage, without producing a counterfactually higher productivity
level of new hires relative to continuing jobs (Foster et al. 2006).
Our setup emphasizes the distinction between new and continuing matches, as opposed to
e.g. Reiter (2008) who focuses on the timing of job creation in the business cycle. Reiter
(2006) studies the role of embodied technological change on ￿ uctuations in a matching model,
where the productivity of a match depends partially on the aggregate productivity prevailing at
the time of creating the match. We study an economy where matches are not locked into the
prevailing technology at the job creation date as they eventually transit from new to old. We
also model job destruction as arising endogenously from the optimizing decisions of agents in
response to productivity shocks. This allows us to address the role of tenure related productivity
di⁄erences and the non-trivial role of endogenous job destruction and creative destruction e⁄ects
for the ￿ unemployment volatility puzzle￿in the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model, as recently
discussed by Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007a, 2007b).
We show that heterogeneous productivity dynamics of new hires and continuing jobs tack-
les a number of problems in the standard matching model5. First, the model produces a well
behaving Beveridge curve despite endogenous job destruction. Second, it narrows the gap be-
tween the volatility of the model￿ s labour market variables and actual data. The well behaving
Beveridge curve is due to the fact that an aggregate productivity shock creates a temporary
productivity di⁄erence between the two types of matches. This creates an incentive to create
new productive vacancies and destroy the old matches that are temporarily less productive.6
Although employment adjustment does take place through the job destruction margin, it be-
comes less important relative to the standard model: there is a shift of employment adjustment
from the job destruction margin towards the job creation margin. The model thus produces a
creative destruction or cleansing e⁄ect that Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007a,b) suggest as a way
to reconcile the Mortensen-Pissarides model with the data.
4This feature is consistent with the idea that young plants (or ￿rms) adopt more ￿exible organisations to cope
with the greater risk and to exploit new opportunities. This suggests that young ￿rms respond more and possibly
with di⁄erent margins to business cycle shocks than do the old ones (Campbell and Fisher, 1998).
5The standard matching model has di¢ culties to match key correlations and volatility of labour market
variables and output (e.g. Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Hornstein et al. (2005), Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007a)).
In particular, the standard matching model with endogenous job destruction fails to generate a strong positive
(negative) correlation between output (unemployment) and vacancies: the Beveridge curve tends to be upward
sloping. The reason is the sensitivity of the job destruction margin to exogeneous shocks. Moreover, the standard
model fails to generate the high volatility of labour market variables observed in the data.
6A similar mechanism is present also in the recent model by Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007), where old
jobs cannot upgrade their technology in the same phase as new jobs.
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volatility of vacancies and unemployment and the model captures the dynamic correlations be-
tween labour market variables and output (and unemployment) better than the standard match-
ing model. As opposed to many earlier papers (e.g. Farmer (2004), Shimer (2005), Hall (2005),
and Gertler and Trigari (2005)), we do not need to take the route of introducing rigid wages.
Rather, due to the heterogeneity of productivity dynamics and the assumption that wages are
negotiated separately in the new and continuing jobs, wages of newly created matches are more
procyclical than wages of continuing matches, consistent with the empirical evidence.
Finally, following the recent literature which combines New Keynesian monetary policy mod-
els with a search labour market framework, we introduce price rigidities into the model following
Walsh (2005). It turns out that, price rigidities do not alter the basic mechanism. Furthermore,
the transmission of interest rate changes is very similar to the standard New Keynesian model
with search frictions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we construct a Mortensen-Pissarides
type matching model with endogenous job destruction and heterogeneity of matches. Section 3
describes the calibration of the model and in section 4 we analyse the behaviour of the model
in response to productivity shocks. Section 5 introduces nominal rigidities into the model and
discusses the transmission of monetary policy in the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a discrete-time economy where there are three labour market states for both workers
and ￿rms. Workers may be either unemployed, or be employed in a new or an old match.
Analogously, ￿rms may either have an open vacancy, or have an occupied job in a new or an old
match. Firm-worker matches are formed in a search market. All ￿rm-worker pairs are initially
new but may become old at an exogenous transition rate. Both new and old matches are subject
to exogenous and endogenous job destruction. New and old matches di⁄er wrt. their production
function. Consequently their reservation productivity and job ￿ ow dynamics di⁄er.
2.1 Match productivity
The productivity of a match depends on two factors: aggregate technology zt which is common
to all matches and on match-speci￿c productivity ait for which a value is drawn from a stationary
distribution F (ait) in each period. The stochastic shocks to zt take place at the beginning of
each period.
New and old jobs di⁄er along two dimensions. First, newly created jobs are more responsive
to aggregate technology shocks than continuing matches. Second, in line with the empirical
evidence we allow the average productivity of old jobs to be higher than that of new jobs.
Formally, match output in a newly created and continuing matches is given by
aitxN (zt) = aitzt (1)
aitxO (zt;￿) = ait (z
￿
t ￿ ￿) (2)
9
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that follows an AR(1) process. Parameters ￿ and ￿ capture the relative responsiveness of old and
new matches to aggregate technology shocks and the average productivity di⁄erence between new
and old matches. Note that the empirical evidence suggests that ￿ < 1 and ￿ < 0. The parameter
￿ < 1 summarizes a number of reasons why continuing jobs may fail to fully incorporate the
latest vintage of aggregate technology to their production process. For example, adoption of
new technologies or managerial innovations may require costly organizational changes in a ￿rm,
changes in working practices, costly software updates etc. We abstract from the speci￿cs of such
obstacles/costs as our focus is on understanding the implications of this type of heterogeneity.
The parameter ￿ captures increasing productivity with tenure that may be attributed to e.g.
learning by doing or learning of match quality.
2.2 Matching and job ￿ ows
Unemployed workers and open vacancies are matched in a search labour market characterized by





which is increasing in the number of unemployed workers ut and open vacancies vt and where
0 < ￿ < 1. We thus assume that the matching function satis￿es the standard properties.7
The probability of an open vacancy getting ￿lled and the probability of a worker moving from









respectively, and where we denote labour market tightness ￿t = vt




t is increasing in ￿t:
After being matched in period t, a ￿rm-worker pair enters the next period t + 1 as a new
match. In the beginning of that period, before production starts, it becomes immediately old
with probability ￿ or remains new with probability 1 ￿ ￿. For already existing matches the
same transition rule applies: matches that have remained new until that date become old with
probability ￿ or remain new with probability 1￿￿ in the beginning of each period. Old matches
remain old, and cannot become new.
Once the distribution of match types is determined, a fraction ￿x of both types is destroyed
by an exogenous shock. The surviving ￿rm-worker pairs observe the aggregate productivity
shock zt and their match speci￿c productivity realization ait; after which they decide whether
to start production or separate endogenously. There is a reservation productivity ~ a
j
t;j = N;O
for both match types such that all new matches with productivity ait > ~ a
j
t start production and
7The standard matching function is assumed to be homogenous and increasing in both of it￿ s arguments,
concave and to have constant returns to scale.
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where F (:) denotes cumulative distribution function of match speci￿c productivity realizations.
Note importantly that the reservation productivities ~ aN
t and ~ aO
t are not necessarily the same,
although we assume that the match speci￿c productivity draws are from the same distributions.
The total separation rate for matches of type j is
￿
j
t = ￿x + (1 ￿ ￿x)￿
nj
t : (7)
The separated workers return to the pool of searching unemployed workers within the same
period.
We next turn to the job ￿ ow equations. The number of new matches that enter a period is
given by
nN








t+1 is the measure of employed new workers at the beginning of period t + 1 before
production takes place. This consists of those workers that were matched in the previous period
m(ut;vt) and new workers of the previous period who remained new and survived from job
destruction in the previous period. Notice that if ￿ = 1; the measure of new workers at the
beginning of period t + 1 consists of new matches only, i.e. nN
t+1 = m(ut;vt).











t is a measure of employed old workers at the beginning of period t+1 before production
takes place. This consists of those who were old and survived from job destruction in the previous
period. It also contains those who became old at the beginning of period t + 1 (when entering
period t + 1). Alternatively, these are workers who were new in period t and became old at the
end of the period after the end of production. Once more, notice a special case where ￿ = 1:













The number of searching workers ut in period t di⁄ers from the number of unemployed workers
1￿nt in the beginning of period t as some of the employed workers separate from their matches
and start searching for a new job within the same period. A measure of workers who search in
period t (and thus are not involved in production) is






where 1 ￿ nt is the number of unmatched workers in the beginning of the period. (1 ￿ ￿)￿N
t nN
t
is the number of new matches at the beginning of the period that remain new and are subject
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t and start to search, and ￿O
t (nO
t + ￿nN
t ) is the number of matches
in the beginning of the period which are destroyed at rate ￿O
t and start to search. This consists
of those that were already old at the beginning of period t; nO
t ; and those that were new, but
became old at the beginning of period t, ￿nN
t :
Next we turn into the net job creation and destruction rates. In each period q
f
t vt new
vacancies are ￿lled. A fraction ￿x of the new and previously existing matches are destroyed
exogenously at the beginning of the period. The rate of turnover is then q
f
t ￿xnt and the net job





















where the ￿rst term on the RHS is the aggregate job destruction rate and q
f
t ￿x are the exogenously
destroyed matches that re-match within the same period.8
2.3 Value functions and match surplus
Match surplus is a key element in determining job creation and destruction. The surplus is the


















t (ait) and W
j
t (ait) are the asset values for a ￿rm and worker respectively of being matched
and Vt and Ut are the asset values of being idle for the ￿rm and the worker, that is, having an
open vacancy for the ￿rm and being unemployed for the worker.
The asset value to a ￿rm of a ￿lled new job with match speci￿c productivity realization ait
is given by
JN
it = aitxN (zt) ￿ wN




















The value consists of the current payo⁄, given by the real value of match output aitxN (zt) = aitzt
net of the wage cost wN
it (ait), and the expected future payo⁄of the match which is discounted ac-
cording to the discount factor ￿: With probability ￿ the match becomes old and with probability
1 ￿ ￿ it remains new. The match survives exogenous job destruction with probability (1 ￿ ￿x).
For a surviving match that remains new or becomes old, a productivity realization below the
respective reservation productivity ~ aN
t+1 or ~ aO
t+1 leads to endogenous separation. A match with a
8In the de￿nitions of job destruction and job creation, we follow Trigari (2004) and Den Haan et. al. (2000).
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a new or an old match. In case of separation the ￿rm gets the asset value of an open vacancy
Vt+1:
The asset value of an old job is given by
JO
it = aitxO (zt) ￿ wO







t+1 (a)f (a)da + ￿xVt+1
#
(16)
where match output and wage are determined by aitxO (zt;￿) = ait (z
￿
t ￿ ￿) in period t and
otherwise the equation has the same interpretation as the one for a new job. ￿ is the vintage
parameter and ￿ determines a relative sensitivity of new matches to technology shocks when
compared to old matches. For an old match the expected future payo⁄of the match is analogous
to that of a new job, except that for old matches the future value is always that of an old match,
as there is no transition from old matches back to new matches.
The value of an open vacancy satis￿es























where ￿ is the periodical search cost and the expected payo⁄ of search is given by the second
RHS term. With a probability q
f
t the ￿rm matches with a worker, and with probability ￿ the
match becomes old and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ it remains new. Endogenous separation and job
values are given as above. If the ￿rm doesn￿ t match it gets the asset value of an open vacancy
Vt+1:
Workers may either be unemployed and searching for a job or employed in a new or old
match. The asset value of working in a new job with match speci￿c productivity ait is
WN
it = wN



















The worker receives a wage of a new job wN
it (ait) in period t, depending on the production
function aitxN (zt) = aitzt. In the next period, with probability ￿ the match becomes old and
with probability 1 ￿ ￿ it remains new. If the match survives exogenous job destruction, the
old or new match with a productivity realization below the reservation productivity ~ aO
t+1 and
~ aN
t+1 respectively will separate endogenously. A match with a productivity realization above
the respective reservation productivity will produce as either new or old matches with the value
W
j
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WO
it = wO







t+1 (at+1)f (a)da + ￿xUt+1
#
(19)
with an analogous interpretation to equation (16) above. Notice that if matches are similar in
all respects, equation (18) and (19) deliver the same. In particular, transition probability has no
e⁄ect on determination of wages.
The value of unemployment Ut is given by
Ut = b + Et￿
(
qw


















where b is the ￿ ow utility of non-market activities and the term in brackets is the asset value of
search on the labour market. With a probability qw
t the worker matches with a ￿rm, and with
probability ￿ the match becomes old and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ it remains new. Endogenous
separation and the asset values of being matched in an old and new match are given analogously
as above. An unmatched worker continues to receive the asset value of unemployment Ut+1:
2.4 Wage determination
We assume that wages are negotiated each period and separately for new and old matches. In
both match types, the total intertemporal match surplus is shared through a Nash-bargaining
process between the ￿rm and the worker, giving rise to two separate Nash wage equations.











t (ait) ￿ Vt
i1￿￿
; j = N;O (21)















Substituting from the value equations and using the free entry condition Vt = 0 in the ￿rst





aitxj (zt) + ￿￿t
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)b; j = N;O (23)
The wage depends both on idiosyncratic and aggregate conditions. Equation (23) also re￿ ects
the fact that wages are bargained after the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity ait. The
Nash wage equation implies that the wage dynamics between the new and old matches di⁄er
to the extent that match speci￿c productivity ait and responsiveness to aggregate technology
9See appendix for details.
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matches by relying on di⁄erent match productivity dynamics, instead of assuming that the wage
determination mechanism between new and old matches di⁄ers. The wage equation captures the
standard feature that the worker￿ s wage becomes increasingly dependent on the idiosyncratic
component as the employment relationship matures. This re￿ ects a higher dependence on ac-
cumulated match speci￿c skills and less dependence on the value of outside job opportunities,
which are more cyclical than the match speci￿c component of wages. In this sense, the wages
of old jobs appear more sticky than the wages of new jobs.














t(a)da; j = N;O: (24)
































































is a measure of workers who after transition are in old
matches and have survived job destruction. In essence, the aggregate wage is a weighted average
(with time varying weights) of the wages in new and old matches. Consequently, the aggregate
wage dynamics contain the composition e⁄ect due to ￿ uctuations in the share of workers in old
and new jobs. Note that in the special case where ￿ = 1; equation (25) implies that wt = wO
t :
This is natural, since in this case all new matches become old before the endogenous decision to
continue with the match takes place, and thus before the wages are bargained.
2.5 Job creation and destruction
2.5.1 Job creation condition
Free entry of ￿rms to the market implies that ￿rms enter until the value of posting a vacancy is
driven to zero in equilibrium. Setting Vt+i = 0 in (17) and substituting equation (15) produces




















This equation states that expected search costs are equal to expected value of a ￿lled job. The
expected value of a ￿lled job takes into account the transition probability of new job becoming
old immediately.
The job creation condition can be expressed more explicitly as a function of endogenous
reservation productivities of the two job types. Using the free-entry condition and the relevant
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JN
it = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
aitxN (zt) ￿ b
￿
￿ ￿￿￿t (27)
















it = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
aitxO (zt) ￿ b
￿





t+1 (a)f (a)da (28)
Evaluating these expressions at ait = ~ a
j






= 0; and then subtracting the
resulting equations from (27) and (28) respectively yields
J
j
it = (1 ￿ ￿)xj (zt)
￿





Substituting (29) into the job creation condition (26) we arrive to an alternative expression for




























Naturally, there is only one job creation condition in the model, since all the new jobs are
new matches.
2.5.2 Job destruction condition
Jobs are endogenously destroyed when the realization of match productivity makes the value of





t) = 0; j = N;O (31)
This condition implicitly determines the reservation productivities for old and new jobs.
Because new and old jobs di⁄er by productivity dynamics also the reservation productivities,
and thus job destruction rates, for old and new matches are distinct. Due to the assumption of
Nash bargaining this reservation productivity can equally be determined by the value of ~ a
j
t at
which match surplus is zero for either the ￿rm or the worker.
Setting (27) and (28) to equal zero and substituting (29) we obtain the following job destruc-
tion conditions for new and old jobs
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We can relate the two reservation productivities by setting the LHS of (32) and (33) equal
and cancelling terms. This yields






















t xO (zt) ￿ ~ aN
t xN (zt)
This relation will be used in the calibration of reservation productivities.
2.6 Aggregate output
Aggregate output Qt is determined by output produced by workers in the new and old matches.









































t)dait, j = N;O; is the conditional expectation of productivity
realizations in new and old matches, and where we have used the fact that (1 ￿ ￿
j
t) = (1 ￿
￿x)[1 ￿ F(~ a
j
t)]: Note that although the match speci￿c productivity draws arrive from the same
distribution F(:), possibly di⁄ering reservation productivities imply that the average productivity
of the match types may di⁄er. This is the case when we allow for vintage structure and set
￿ 6= 0:10 Finally, aggregate income Yt de￿ned as total production net of vacancy costs is:
Yt = Qt ￿ ￿vt: (36)
10In principle, one could also assume that the distributions for the ￿rst and subsequent period matches are
di⁄erent. This approach has been taken for instance in Mortensen and Nagypal (2007)
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We study the model￿ s properties by linearizing the respective equilibrium conditions around
their deterministic steady state and then evaluating the model￿ s performance by means of im-
pulse responses and stochastic simulations.11 In particular, we compare the main unconditional
moments produced by di⁄erent versions of the model to those of the quarterly US data during
1951-2003. Our main interest is to contrast the performance of the model with heterogenous
matches to the standard model. The standard model is obtained by setting ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0 and
￿ = 1: Our strategy is to calibrate the standard model following typical values from the literature
(e.g. Walsh (2003, 2005), Trigari (2004), Krause and Lubik (2003) and den Haan et al. (2000)).
Table 1 summarizes the calibration of the standard model.
The quarterly discount factor is set to ￿ = 0:99. Job ￿ ows are determined by the matching
and separation probabilities of ￿rms and workers. The quarterly rate of ￿lling vacancies is set
to ￿ qf = 0:71, following den Haan et al. (2000). The job ￿nding probability of the workers is set
endogenously to ￿ qw = 0:61. This implies that labour market tightness ￿ ￿ is 0:87. Shimer (2005)
reports monthly job ￿nding probability to be 0:45 in the US. If we aggregate the monthly job
￿nding probability of 0:45 to a quarterly frequency, we get ￿ qw = 0:83 = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ 0:45)3). This
is somewhat higher than the our value of 0:61. For the the matching function, we set ￿ = 0:4.
This is in accordance with the empirical studies of the matching function12. As for the worker￿ s
bargaining power and value of leisure, we use a standard calibration of ￿ = ￿: This internalizes
the search externality.13 The size of the labour force is normalized to one and the employment
rate is set to ￿ n = 0:94; which implies an unemployment rate of 6 percent, close to true mean in
the US data. For the exogenous job destruction rate we use the value calibrated by den Haan et
al. (2000) ￿x = 0:068 and this is the same for both new and old matches.14
Since our model makes a distinction between new and continuing matches, we need to de-
termine the relative share of new and old matches in the steady state. We calibrate this share
such that at given values of ￿ and ￿; the aggregate job destruction rate is consistent with the
empirical value of 0:1. We do this by employing the aggregate (steady state) job destruction rate





1 ￿ ￿ ￿O￿
￿
￿ ￿O + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿O)
(37)
to compute ￿ ￿O and thus reservation productivity ~ a
O
for old jobs at given ￿: After ￿nding ￿ ￿O we
infer ￿ nN from the aggregate constraint ￿ nN = ￿ n ￿ ￿ nO. Using a linearized version of (34) and ~ a
O
11Linearised equations and the deterministic steady state equations are provided in appendix A.1 and A.2.
12See e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
13This is also known as Hosios (1990) e¢ ciency condition: Workers bargaining power ￿ is equal to elasticity of
matching function with respect to unemployment. This makes bargaining e¢ cient, in the sense that it maximizes
the present value of market and non market income net of vacancy costs in the standard model. See Shimer
(2005) for details.
14In the steady state, a measure of old matches which is destroyed must be equal to the measure of new matches
that become old minus the measure which is destroyed. This secures that steady state distribution of old and
new matches is well de￿ned and constant in the steady state.
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N
.
Note that in the standard case, where ￿ = 1; (37) implies that ￿ nO =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿O￿
￿ n. This is natural,
since it states that, in the steady state, the measure of old matches must be equal to ￿ n minus
those destroyed. We assume that F
￿
~ aj￿
; j = N;O is log normal c.d.f. with support ￿lnA = 0
and ￿lnA = 0:12:15 These values are roughly consistent with den Haan et al. (2000) and Walsh
(2005) and Krause and Lubik (2005).
Once reservation productivities for new and old matches have been found, we infer m(ut;vt)
from the steady state equation (3) and then compute ￿ v and ￿ qw from (4) and (5). The level




1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿N)
(38)
Note again that in the standard case where ￿ = 1;this reduces to ￿ nN = A￿ ￿
1￿￿￿ u: The
periodical search cost ￿ and the value of leisure b are inferred from the steady state job creation
condition (52) and the job destruction condition for old jobs (54), respectively.
Finally, the log of the aggregate productivity shock zt is assumed to follow the ￿rst order
autoregressive process. We estimate the AR(1) coe¢ cient and the standard error of innovations
using the US data (see appendix B for details of the data). The point estimate for the ￿rst
order autocorrelation coe¢ cient is 0:78 with an unconditional standard deviation of 0:014 for the
HP(1600) ￿ltered productivity process. Innovations have a standard error of 0:0088.16 These
values are basically the same as those reported in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
Parameter Value Steady state Value
￿ 0:99 n 0:94
￿ 0:60 nO=n 0:9
￿ ￿ b= ￿ w 0:63
￿lnA 0 ￿v=￿ y 0:009
￿lnA 0:12 v 0:13
￿x 0:068 u 0:15
￿ 1 ￿ ￿O 0:10
￿ 1 ￿ ￿N 0:10
￿ 0 ￿ qf 0:71
￿￿ 0:0088 ￿ qw 0:61
￿z 0:78 ￿ ￿ 0:10
A 0:65
Table 1: Parameters and steady state values in the standard model
As for the explicit values of the parameters ￿, ￿ and ￿; recall that the standard model is
15Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) used uniform distribution for F(~ a).
16Labour productivity is measured in terms of log real non-farm output per log total non-farm employment
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before the endogenous decision to continue with the match takes place. In addition, all matches
are similar in their responsiveness to productivity shocks and the steady state level of match
productivities are the same.
To calibrate the heterogeneity, we draw on di⁄erent literature. First, our preferred value for
￿, the responsiveness of old matches to aggregate technology shocks, involves matching the re-
sponsiveness of wages of new and old jobs to aggregate unemployment rate roughly in accordance
with the empirical literature summarized for instance in Pissarides (2008). In our preferred cali-
bration, the di⁄erence between the elasticity of wages to unemployment of new and old matches
is roughly 1:3, which is a plausible value in the light of the empirical evidence summarized in
Pissarides (2008). This is achieved by setting ￿ = 0:5: Note that, in general, ￿ < 1 captures the
basic idea of Caballero and Hammour (1998) and Campbell (1995) that the new ￿rms receive
productivity associated with the latest technology.
In order to calibrate the productivity level parameter ￿, we exploit the following features.
On the one hand, ￿ < 0 implies that in the steady state, the new jobs have a higher destruction
rate than the old jobs. On the other hand, ￿ < 0 reduces an incentive to replace old matches
with new ones in the face of positive and persistent productivity shocks. Combining ￿ = ￿0:03
with ￿ = 0:1 and ￿ = 0:5 results in the standard error of aggregate job separation rate which is
reasonably close to its empirical value of 2:78. At the same time, the separation rate of new jobs
is roughly 20 % higher than that in the old jobs, also a reasonable number. Finally, as for the
calibration of ￿; we rely on Baldwin (1995), who has found that about half of the new entrants
die within the ￿rst decade, while those who survive reach average productivity in about decade.
This seems to support the fact that transition from new to old is a very slow process, i.e. that
realistic values for ￿ should be closer to zero than 1. Since the empirical evidence does not give
us a direct way to calibrate exact values for ￿; we let ￿ 2 (1;0:3;0:1): Our preferred value for ￿
is 0:1. An alternative way to calibrate the key parameters (￿; ￿) would be to draw on micro level
evidence on the wage-tenure relationship. For instance, Arozamena and Centeno (2006) ￿nd
that the current wage-current unemployment elasticity signi￿cantly decreases with tenure. That
the wage level increases with tenure has also been reported in a number of studies as discussed
earlier. However, this evidence, although highly relevant to our basic idea, is di¢ cult to quantify
in our simpli￿ed model setup. We thus focus on the basic mechanism but note that existing
micro-evidence on wage-tenure relationship could warrant alternative calibration strategies.
4 Equilibrium responses to technology shocks
After a persistent technology shock, the standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model suggests
that vacancies and thus also net job creation reacts on impact, while output and unemployment
follow a hump-shape pattern. Labour market tightness or the vacancies to unemployment ratio,
v=u, reacts also on impact. Due to the hump shaped pattern of the unemployment rate, the
model with endogenous job destruction has di¢ culties to produce a negative correlation between
vacancies and unemployment, i.e. that after a positive technology shock the vacancy rate goes up
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exhibits less such di¢ culties.
4.1 Responsiveness of new and old matches
We start the discussion of the model￿ s performance by considering the heterogeneity in respon-
siveness of new and old matches to aggregate productivity shocks. We set ￿ = 0:5 s.t. old
matches are less responsive than new hires and study two cases where the transition rate ￿ = 0:5
and ￿ = 0:3; while keeping ￿ = 0 in both cases. In each case, we re-calibrate the share of old
matches to total employment such that ￿ ￿ = 0:1: Notice also that in the steady state the reser-
vation productivity of old and new matches are the same. This is due to the fact that ￿ = 0 so
the steady state average productivity level of new and old matches is equal i.e. we abstract from
the vintage structure. We discuss the role of vintage later on.
4.1.1 Impulse responses
Figure 1 draws the impulse responses. In response to aggregate productivity shocks, the model
with heterogeneous matches (￿ = 0:5 with ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:1) shows a clearly stronger response
of vacancies and job creation when compared to the standard model. The response of vacancies
also shows clearly more persistence. On the contrary, the response of job destruction becomes
muted.
Comparing the relative responses of job creation and job destruction, it is clear that het-
erogeneity shifts employment adjustment increasingly to the job creation margin (compare the
case where ￿ = 0:3 and ￿ = 0:1 to the standard model in Figure 1. After a positive technology
shock, a temporary productivity di⁄erence between new and old jobs creates an incentive for
￿rms to create new productive vacancies and destroy the old matches that are temporarily less
productive. As a result, job destruction decreases less and job creation increases more, relative
to the standard model. This shifting of the adjustment margin towards job creation becomes
stronger as the probability of transition from new to old jobs is smaller.
This is clearly visible in Figure 2, which shows the equilibrium responses of employment, wage
and job destruction in new and old matches in the di⁄erent model speci￿cations: An aggregate
productivity shock generates a temporary but persistent productivity di⁄erence between new
and old matches. This makes employment adjustment increasingly procyclical (a-cyclical) in the
new matches(old-matches), as transition from new to old matches becomes more sluggish. At
the same time, the employment response in the old matches becomes increasingly muted. At the
aggregate level, the employment response is also muted, since most of the variation in aggregate
employment comes from employment variation of old matches. At the same time, however, the
shift of the adjustment margin from destruction to creation ampli￿es quite strongly the response
of unemployment, especially when the transition from new to old jobs is slow (see Figure 1).
In response to a positive productivity shock, the destruction rate of new jobs reacts strongly
counter-cyclically, leading to a large drop in the ￿ ow of workers from new jobs to unemployment,
and thus in the measure of searching workers. This e⁄ect outweighs the procyclical reaction of
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Standard model f = 0.3,g = 0.5 f = 0.1,g = 0.5
Figure 1: Equilibrium responses to persistent technology shock in di⁄erent model speci￿cations
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The feature that job destruction of old matches becomes pro-cyclical when ￿ is smaller is
a "natural" property of the model (see the low-middle panel of Figure 2). A low ￿ implies
that the expected time of remaining new (and consequently more productive in case of positive
productivity shock) is relatively long. This means that the expected surplus of new matches
is relatively high compared to the expected surplus of old matches and thus a high surplus
di⁄erential makes it bene￿cial to destroy old matches and create new matches. With a higher
transition rate ￿ jobs become old at a higher rate (faster), so the di⁄erence in expected surplus
between new and old matches is smaller.
To demonstrate this further, consider the extreme high value ￿ = 1 where matches tran-
sit immediately to being old before production starts.17 In this case newly created and older
matches all have equal productivity and react to productivity shocks in an analogous way. All
matches then have equal expected surplus and there is no reason for replacing old jobs with new
ones. In other words, when all matches are homogeneous, a productivity shock will increase
the expected surplus of all matches equally, implying a lower reservation productivity ~ ait for all
matches. Higher expected surplus induces more job creation and the lower reservation productiv-
ity reduces job destruction, so job creation is procyclical and job destruction is countercyclical.
As the transition probability ￿ decreases, the expected duration of a match remaining new (high
productivity and highly shock responsive) increases and the expected surplus of new matches
increases relative to that of old matches. A ￿rm with an old match will now observe the match
speci￿c productivity and implied surplus of the current match and the expected value of posting
a new vacancy. If the latter value is higher, the ￿rm will destroy the current old match and post
a vacancy to search for a new match. The lower is the transition probability ￿ and therefore
the higher the di⁄erence in match surplus between new and old matches, the higher is the reser-
vation value for the match speci￿c productivity for old matches that leads to job destruction
and creation of a new vacancy. Thus the model produces a "creative destruction" e⁄ect that
increases as the transition rate decreases.
Figure 2 also shows that the wages in the new matches are more volatile than the wages
in the old matches when the heterogeneity is allowed for. This is a direct consequence of new
matches being more responsive to productivity ￿ uctuations than the old matches, and the fact
that Nash bargaining takes place separately to the new and old. Note also that temporary shifts
in the composition of new and old matches drive partly the ￿ uctuations of aggregate wages. The
positive productivity shock increases the number of new matches with more responsive wages
contributing to a stronger response of the aggregate wage in the economy. At the same time,
wage ￿ uctuations in continuing matches are moderate. This is consistent with the ￿ndings of
Haefke et al. (2008) who argue that the relevant wage data for the search model are the wages of
new hires, not aggregate wages. They show that wages for newly hired workers respond strongly,
even one-for-one, to changes in labour productivity. Also Carneiro et al. (2008) cast some doubt
on whether wage stickiness is primary explanation for the unemployment volatility puzzle Using
matched longitudinal employer-employee data from Portugal, they ￿nd that the real wage of
17This case is e⁄ectively the benchmark Mortensen-Pissarides model.
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August 2009continuously employed workers is moderately procyclical, while entering worker￿ s real wage is
strongly procyclical during 1986-2005. They ￿nd that a one point increase in the unemployment
rate decreases wages of newly hired male workers by around 2.5 % and by just 1.5 % for workers in
continuing jobs. In other words, the elasticity of wages to unemployment of newly hired workers
is roughly 1.7 times larger than in the continuing jobs. In our model, the di⁄erence between the
elasticity of wages to unemployment of new and old matches is roughly 1.3 in the calibration of
the model where ￿ = 0:1; and ￿ = 0:5: This is in the ball park of Carneiro et al. (2008), and
also with the evidence summarized in Pissarides (2008).
4.1.2 Volatilities and correlations
Much of the literature has already explored the quantitative performance of the search models
(for discussion, see e.g. Shimer (2005) and Yashiv (2006)) by studying the model￿ s performance
by means of stochastic simulations. This literature has found that the standard matching model
is not able to generate enough ￿ uctuations in labour market variables, when the main driving
force of those ￿ uctuations are productivity shocks. The standard matching model produces
￿ uctuations in labour market variables that are 2￿3 times smaller than they should be (see also
Table 2). Furthermore, the standard matching model has di¢ culties to match dynamic cross-
correlations between labour market variables and output and unemployment. The standard
model fails in particular with respect to cross-correlations between vacancies and output and
vacancies and unemployment: It generates too high correlation between job destruction and
output and unemployment, but far too little negative (positive) correlation between vacancies
and unemployment rate (output) (See Figures 4-3). A similar failure of the standard model was
found also in Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), who enriched the standard search model with
a real business cycle framework. As Krause and Lubik (2007) point out, employment adjustment
in the standard model takes place through a strong drop in separations rather than through
increased job creation because ￿rms can instantaneously and costlessly adjust employment at
the separation margin.18 On the other hand, job creation is time consuming and costly. Therefore
￿rms increase employment by keeping even less productive workers instead of engaging in time
consuming and costly search.
In the previous section, the impulse response analysis shows that match hetererogeneity am-
pli￿es the response of vacancies to productivity shocks. This can also be seen from Table 2.
Figures 4-3 show that the model with heterogeneous matches does also a better job in terms
of dynamic cross-correlations. In particular, the model matches much better the pattern of dy-
namic cross-correlations between vacancies and unemployment and vacancies and output than
the standard model. The model with heterogeneous matches produces much higher contempo-
raneous correlation between vacancies and output (and unemployment), without compromising
18The fact that job separations, or job destruction, appear only moderately cyclical and volatile in comparison
to job creation, a feature emphasized by Shimer (2005), has led several authors to abstract from models with
endogenous job destruction and revert to models with exogenous job destruction. However, Elsby, Michaels, and
Solon (2007) argue for an important role of counter-cyclical in￿ow into unemployment, or separations, over the
business cycle in the US.
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Labour market tightness ( q)
Data f = 0.3,g = 0.5,l = 0 95% conf. band 95% conf. band Standard model
Figure 3: Dynamic cross-correlations of selected labour market variables and unemployment at t ￿ i.
Note: Blue (dark) lines correspond to the data, red (semi-light) lines correspond to the model with
heterogenous matches and grey (light) lines correspond to the standard model.
the ￿t in the other dimensions.19
From Table 2, columns Het Match I - Het Match III , we can also con￿rm that the model with
heterogeneous matches generates more ￿ uctuations in vacancies and unemployment, compared
with the standard model.20 This higher volatility in vacancies is due to the shifting of the
adjustment margin from job destruction to job creation discussed earlier. There is also an
increase in the volatility of labour market tightness and job ￿nding rate in the model with
heterogeneous matches.
Due to the increased relative importance of job creation margin, however, the model with
heterogeneous matches produces less ￿ uctuations in job destruction, bringing the volatility of
19Introducing convex vacancy costs would also help to match the persistence in vacancy creation, as well as
strong pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) correlation between vacancies and output (unemployment). See for instance
Gertler and Trigari (2006). Convex vacancy costs, however, strongly increases job destruction even beyond the
standard model and what is observed in the data.
20We have compared the standard model and the model with heterogeneous matches (and vintage), also with
the model with convex vacancy costs. Convex vacancy costs are supported by the empirical literature, such as
Yashiv (2000a, 2000b). Convex vacancy costs help to match the high correlation between vacancies and output
and unemployment. However, introduction of convex vacancy costs into the model strongly reduces the volatility
of vacancy creation, since convex vacancy costs makes ￿rms to smooth vacancy creation over time. Moreover,
job destruction becomes more volatile, being a natural consequence of lower volatility of vacancy creation. The
comparison is available on request from the authors.
26
ECB






















Job ￿nding 5.25 1.06 1.85 2.03 1.87
Job destruc. 2.76 4.47 1.71 2.06 3.00
Employment 0.65 0.51 0.43 0.36 0.37
Lab mkt tigh. 12.6 2.63 4.63 5.07 4.67
Wage 0.43 0.32 0.55 0.60 0.52
Unemploym. 6.13 2.93 2.90 3.25 3.51
Vacancies 6.83 2.57 3.13 2.88 2.32
Table 2: Volatility of selected variables in the data and in di⁄erent model speci￿cations. Volatil-






















Job ￿nding 0.75 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.95
Job destruct. -0.58 -0.89 -0.94 -0.95 -0.94
Employment 0.70 0.86 0.83 0.76 0.79
Lab mkt tigh. 0.83 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.95
Wages 0.29 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.95
Unemploym. -0.78 -0.91 -0.94 -0.98 -0.99
Vacancies 0.85 0.23 0.51 0.56 0.42
Table 3: Contemporaneous correlations with output in di⁄erent model speci￿cations
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Job ￿nding 0.80 0.58 0.63 0.55 0.61
Job destruct. 0.48 0.58 0.63 0.55 0.59
Employment 0.92 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.77
Lab mkt tigh. 0.89 0.58 0.69 0.55 0.61
Wages 0.81 0.58 0.63 0.55 0.60
Unemploym. 0.87 0.78 0.85 0.83 0.84
Vacancies 0.91 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.18
Output 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.78
Table 4: Autocorrelations in di⁄erent model speci￿cations
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Data 95 % conf. band 95 % conf. band Standard model f = 0.3, g = 0.5, l = 0
Figure 4: Dynamic cross-correlations of selected labour market variables and output at t ￿ i.
Note: Blue (dark) lines correspond to the data, red (semi-light) lines correspond to the model with
heterogenous matches and grey (light) lines correspond to the standard model.
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between vacancies and output is also clearly visible in Table 2. The standard model produces
contemporaneous correlation of vacancies and output of 0:23, while the model with heterogeneous
matches brings this correlation up to roughly 0:5. In the US quarterly data, this correlation is
0:85. A similar pattern is visible in the contemporaneous correlation between vacancies and
unemployment as well21.
4.2 Average productivity di⁄erence
We have demonstrated above that the model with heterogeneous matches is able to ￿t better the
dynamic cross correlations between vacancies and output and unemployment than the standard
model. The model also generates a well behaving Beveridge curve despite of endogenous job
destruction as well as more ￿ uctuations in vacancies, in the job ￿nding rate and in the labour
market tightness. However, this comes at some cost, by reducing strongly the cyclical ￿ uctuations
in job destruction (See Tables 2-3). Note that empirical evidence suggest that productivity
di⁄erences are persistent, suggesting that in our model the transition probability ￿ should be
calibrated to a relatively low value, perhaps even lower than 0:1. At the same time, however, a
small value of ￿ makes the adjustment at the creation margin stronger, such that that destruction
of old matches becomes eventually pro-cyclical. While this is not totally implausible due to
cleansing type arguments, pro-cyclical aggregate job destruction is not consistent with the data.
Introducing vintage structure i.e. allowing for the average productivity to di⁄er between
matches provides a possible empirically justi￿ed remedy for this problem, as it is consistent
with the microlevel evidence. The empirical evidence points to that fact that the productivity
of new jobs is below that of the already existing jobs on average. In our model, this reduces an
incentive to replace old matches with new ones in the face of positive and persistent productivity
shocks (see Table 2, Het. Match III). While this reduces somewhat the volatility of vacancies,
the model with heterogeneous matches and long run productivity di⁄erence captures better the
key correlation structure and relative volatility observed in the data in general. Furthermore,
the empirical ￿ndings also support the view that the job destruction probability is higher in the
new matches relative to older ones. This feature is captured by our model, since with ￿ < 0,
endogenous separation rate of new jobs is higher than that of the old jobs: when ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 0:1,
￿ = ￿0:03an endogenous separation rate for the new matches is 0:11, while for the old and more
productive matches, endogenous separation rate is 0:09. In other words, job separation rate of
the new matches is about 20 % higher than in the old matches.
21Note that an alternative way to respond to unemployment volatility puzzle is provided in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). They propose to calibrate the value of unemployment to a much higher value than one implied
by the unemployment bene￿ts. Moreover, they suggest to calibrate the value of bargaining power of workers
to very low value. One problem with their approach is that the steady state unemployment rate becomes very
sensitive to assumed values of b, as pointed out by Costain and Reiter (2008). Their approach also does not lead
into strong procyclical (countercyclical) relationship between output (unemployment) and vacancies. It merely
helps to match the volatility of vacancies and unemployment.
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In order to gain further understanding on macroeconomic consequences of matching heterogene-
ity, we extend the model by allowing nominal rigidities. The search framework has been found
a useful tool to model labour markets in the standard New Keynesian setup, which otherwise
features Walrasian labour markets. The basic setup is laid down for instance in Walsh (2005).
The model consists of a continuum of households, who purchase consumption goods, and
supply one unit of labour inelastically. The standard dynamic optimization problem gives rise
to a consumption Euler equation which determines the evolution of a stochastic discount factor
and of consumption. Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, the stochastic discount
factor is used to value the future expected asset values of employment, unemployment, jobs and
vacancies.
Apart from specifying the household￿ s consumption, and thus aggregate demand, the key
additional ingredients in the model are price setting and monetary policy. Price setting takes
place at separate sectors typically referred to as a retail or a ￿nal goods sector. While wholesale
￿rms produce to competitive markets using labour as the only input, the ￿nal good ￿rms compete
at monopolistic markets. Final good ￿rms simply bundle the intermediate goods and sell directly
to the households. In order to capture nominal price stickiness in pricing of the ￿nal goods, Walsh
(2005) follows Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001), and assumes that only a fraction 1￿!
of the ￿rms can optimize their price each period. The remaining ￿rms index their prices to the












for the aggregate in￿ ation rate. ^ ￿t is the deviation of price markup (mark-up of ￿nal over
wholesale prices) from its optimal steady state value and ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ !)(1 ￿ !￿)=!:
The monetary policy is speci￿ed by the Taylor type of rule, where the short-term nominal










￿R is the degree of interest rate smoothing, ￿￿ > 1 is the response coe¢ cient for in￿ ation and
￿r
t is a serially uncorrelated, mean zero stochastic process representing an unanticipated interest
rate shock.
Without going further into the details of the complete model speci￿cation22, we consider the
importance of nominal rigidities in determining the equilibrium response of output and labour
market variables to productivity and interest rate shocks in di⁄erent model speci￿cations. In
calibrating the model, we follow closely Walsh (2005), except that we set habit persistence
parameter to zero. We assume a CRRA utility function with the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion equal to 2: The steady state price markup for retail ￿rms is set equal to 1:1. The degree
of price rigidity is determined by the share of ￿rms who do not optimally adjust their price !.
22Complete speci￿cation is available on request from the authors.
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￿￿ equal to 1:1 which implies a 110 basis points long-run nominal response to a 100 basis point
increase in in￿ ation. Finally, we set ￿R = 0:9 which is roughly consistent with the empirical
evidence on high inertia displayed by central bank policy rules (Walsh 2005).
Figure 5 shows the equilibrium responses to a productivity shock in di⁄erent model spec-
i￿cations. The ￿gure suggests that nominal rigidities dampen the responses of labour market
variables and output to productivity shocks. The responses of output and unemployment show
at the same time somewhat more persistence and the peak e⁄ects occurs clearly later than in
the model without the nominal frictions.
Enriching the standard search model with nominal frictions with the heterogenous matches
improves the model￿ s behavior in the same way as discussed earlier. In response to productivity
shocks, responses of the key labour market variables become stronger and more persistent. This is
particularly true for vacancies and labour market tightness. As for in￿ ation, output and interest
rates, heterogeneity does not have quantitatively important implications. This is primarily due
to the fact that in this setup, search frictions per se has no implications on price setting behaviour
of the ￿rms, since vacancy posting decisions and price setting decisions of individual ￿rms occur
separately.
What about the transmission of monetary policy? In ￿gure 6 we consider the impact of an
unanticipated change in the interest rate in the standard search model with nominal frictions and
the one with heterogeneous matches. We draw the same conclusion as regards the productivity
shocks, namely that quantitatively heterogeneity does not have important implications for the
transmission of interest rate changes at the aggregate level. However, inspection of dynamics
of employment, wages and job destruction in the new and old matches separately reveals some
di⁄erences. Notably, allowing for heterogeneous matches leads into more muted employment
response of the new matches when compared with the standard model. This is mirrored by
a stronger impact of job destruction in the new matches. The impact of heterogeneity on the
dynamics of old matches is small: this also drives the results at the aggregate level, given that
most of the dynamics in the aggregate labour market variables arise from the old matches.
6 Concluding remarks
The current labour market matching literature has overlooked match heterogeneity23, and overem-
phasized the role of wage rigidity as a possible remedy for the di¢ culty of standard matching
models to ￿t the key moments of the data. In this paper, we have developed a matching model
with two types of ￿rm-worker pairs, labelled as new and old. In accordance with the empirical
evidence, we have assumed that new matches are more sensitive to productivity ￿ uctuations
upon job creation than already existing matches, and extended the model to the case where
already existing matches are on average more productive than the new matches. Our main con-
tribution to the literature is to make old jobs￿wages more rigid than new ones without resorting
to alternative wage setting mechanisms or ad hoc wage rigidity.
23There are few exceptions, however, such as Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Reiter (2006).
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Figure 5: Equilibrium responses to productivity shocks in di⁄erent model speci￿cations with nominal
rigidities
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Figure 6: Equilibrium responses to unanticipated interest rate shock in di⁄erent model speci￿cations
with nominal rigidities
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particular, our model produces a well behaving Beveridge curve despite endogenous job destruc-
tion and it narrows the gap between the volatility of the model￿ s labour market variables and
actual data. Furthermore, the model captures the dynamic correlations between labour market
variables and output (and unemployment) better than the standard matching model, without a
need to rely on wage rigidity.
In our model wages of new hires are more responsive to aggregate technology shocks compared
to wages of existing hires, consistently with the ￿ndings of Haefke et al. (2008), Carneiro et al.
(2008), and other studies summarized in Pissarides (2008). We show that persistent productivity
di⁄erences across matches generated in the model shift the employment adjustment from the job
destruction margin towards the job creation margin. In our model, an aggregate productivity
shock creates a temporary but persistent productivity di⁄erence between the two types of jobs.
After a positive and persistent technology shock, this creates an incentive for ￿rms to create new
productive vacancies and destroy the old matches that are temporarily less productive. Although
employment adjustment does take place through the job destruction margin, this e⁄ect makes
job destruction less important relative to the standard model. As a result, the model produces
well behaving Beveridge curve, despite job destruction being endogenously determined. Also the
volatility of the vacancies and unemployment increases.
Finally, we incorporated nominal frictions into the model following Walsh (2005) and studied
transmission of productivity and interest rate shocks in the extended model. As for the interest
rate shocks, it turned out that heterogeneity per se does not have quantitatively important
implications for the transmission of interest rate changes in the model at the aggregate level. An
obvious, but not necessarily straightforward, extension of our framework would be to allow price
setting and vacancy posting decisions to occur within a single ￿rm, following Krause and Lubik
(2005), Kuester (2007), and Thomas (2008). In these models, search frictions give rise to real
rigidity, which leads into more sluggish wage and price responses.
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A.1 Steady state equations
￿ Number of new matches that enter a given period
￿ nN =
A￿ u￿￿ v1￿￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿N)
(41)
￿ Number of old matches that enter a given period
￿ nO =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿O￿
￿￿ n
￿ ￿O + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿O)
(42)
￿ Aggregate employment
￿ n = ￿ nN + ￿ nO (43)
￿ Unemployed job seekers
￿ u = 1 ￿ ￿ n + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿N￿ nN + ￿ ￿O(￿ nO + ￿￿ nN) (44)
￿ Separation rate for matches of type j
￿ ￿j = ￿x + (1 ￿ ￿x)￿ ￿nj: (45)
￿ Firm￿ s hazard rate
￿ qf =
m(￿ u; ￿ v)
￿ v
(46)
￿ Worker￿ s hazard rate
￿ qw =
m(￿ u; ￿ v)
￿ u
(47)









￿ ￿ qf￿x (49)
￿ Net job destruction rate
jdr =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿N￿ nN + ￿ ￿O(￿ nO + ￿￿ nN)
￿ n
￿ ￿ qf￿x (50)
￿ Aggregate job destruction rate
￿ ￿ =
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August 2009 38￿ Job creation condition (determines ￿ qf):
￿
￿ qf = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
n
￿￿ xO ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿O￿h
H (~ aO) ￿ ~ a
Oi
(52)
+(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ xN ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿N￿h
H (~ aN) ￿ ~ a
Nio
￿ Job destruction condition, new jobs (determines reservation productivity for new jobs).
~ a
N








HO (~ a) ￿ ~ a
Oi
+(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ xN ￿ ’N
h
HN (~ a) ￿ ~ a
Nio
= 0
￿ Job destruction condition, old jobs (determines reservation productivity for old jobs)
~ a
O
￿ xO ￿ b ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ + ￿￿ xO￿ ’O
h
HO (~ a) ￿ ~ a
Oi
= 0 (54)
￿ Average wage, new jobs.
￿ wN = ￿
h
￿ xNH (~ aN) + ￿￿ ￿
i
+ (1 ￿ ￿)b (55)
￿ Average wage, old jobs.
￿ wO = ￿
h
￿ xOH (~ aO) + ￿￿ ￿
i
+ (1 ￿ ￿)b (56)
￿ Average aggregate wage.
￿ w =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿N￿
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nN




1 ￿ ￿ ￿O￿￿
￿ nO + ￿￿ nN￿





1 ￿ ￿ ￿N￿
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nNxN
t H (~ aN) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿O￿
￿ nOxO
t H (~ aO) + ￿￿ xO￿ nNH (~ aO)) (58)
￿ Output, net of vacancy costs.
￿ Y = ￿ Q ￿ ￿￿ v: (59)
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￿ Number of old matches that enter a given period
^ nO
t+1 = ￿ ’O(^ ’
O
t + ^ nO
t ) + ￿ ’O￿
￿ nN
￿ nO (^ ’
O












￿ Unemployed job seekers.
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￿ ’N ^ ￿
N
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￿ Firm￿ s hazard rate
^ qw
t = ￿￿A^ ￿t (68)
￿ Worker￿ s hazard rate
^ qw
t = (1 ￿ ￿)A^ ￿t (69)
￿ Labor market tightness
^ ￿t = ^ vt ￿ ^ ut (70)
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August 2009 40￿ Productivity, new jobs
^ xN
t = ^ zt (71)
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￿￿ ￿^ ￿t (78)
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￿ ’N (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nN ￿ wN(^ ’
N
t + ^ nN
t )
￿ ’N (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nN ￿ wN + ￿ ’O [￿ nO + ￿￿ nN] ￿ wO
+
￿ ’O ￿ wO[￿ nO(^ ’
O
t + ^ nO
t ) + ￿￿ nN(^ ’
O
t + ^ nN
t )]
￿ ’N (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nN ￿ wN + ￿ ’O [￿ nO + ￿￿ nN] ￿ wO
+
[￿ ’N (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nN ￿ wN] ^ wN
t + ￿ ’O ￿ wO[￿ nO + ￿￿ nN] ^ wO
t
￿ ’N (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nN ￿ wN + ￿ ’O [￿ nO + ￿￿ nN] ￿ wO
￿
￿ ’N (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nN(^ ’
N
t + ^ nN
t ) + ￿ ’O[￿ nO(^ ’
O
t + ^ nO
t ) + ￿￿ nN(^ ’
O
t + ^ nN
t )]
￿ ’N (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nN + ￿ ’O [￿ nO + ￿￿ nN]
￿ Output.
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t + ^ nO









t + ^ nN






￿ Aggregate income net of vacancy costs
^ yt￿ y = ^ Qt ￿ Q ￿ ￿￿ v^ vt (83)
A.3 Derivation of the wage equation
The match surplus is shared between the ￿rm and the worker according to the parameter ￿ which
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Substituting the values for a ￿lled job, the value of working, the value of unemployment and
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t+1 (at+1)f (a)da ￿ Ut+1
!#
￿b ￿ Et￿qw













t+1 (at+1)f (a)da ￿ Ut+1
#)
Using the free-entry condition Vt = 0 in the Nash bargaining ￿rst-order condition (85) gives the
relation ￿J
j






: Using this to cancel terms and re-arranging produces
wN
it (ait) = ￿aitxN
t + (1 ￿ ￿)
(
b + Et￿qw














t+1 (at+1)f (a)da ￿ Ut+1
!#)
Use the Nash ￿rst order condition to transform the equation into
wN
it (ait) = ￿aitxN
t + (1 ￿ ￿)
(
b + Et￿qw


















Substitute using the job creation condition (26) to obtain
wN
it (ait) = ￿aitxN
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wN
it (ait) = ￿aitxN









Substituting the values for a ￿lled job, the value of working, the value of unemployment and
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t+1 (at+1)f (a)da ￿ Ut+1
#
￿b ￿ Et￿qw













t+1 (at+1)f (a)da ￿ Ut+1
#)
Use the Nash bargaining ￿rst-order condition (85) to cancel terms from the ￿rst two rows of this
equation and rearrange to get
wO



















t+1 (at+1)f (a)da ￿ Ut+1
!#)
Then proceed as in the derivation of wN
it (ait) in the preceding subsection to obtain
wO
it (ait) = ￿aitxO









The data is collected from various US sources. Job ￿nding rate and job separation rate are
from Robert Shimer￿ s homepage. Vacancies (help wanted index) are from St. Louis Fed data-
base. Unemployment rate is from BLS database, series LNS14000000. Production is mea-
sured as per capita non-farm output, directly from NIPA tables. Real wage is measured as
nominal compensation￿output
hours￿nominal output , using series PRS85006043, PRS85006033, PRS85006063, PRS85006053)
from BLS. Employment is total non-farm employment, series CES0000000001 from BLS. Unem-
ployment is series LNU03000000 from BLS. Job ￿nding rate, job separation rate, vacancies,
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August 2009 44employment and unemployment are quarterly averages, computed from monthly data. When
computing the moments, all the variables have been transformed in logarithmics. Logarithmic
variables have been then HP ￿ltered with ￿
HP = 1600. Figure 7 shows the key variables.
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1080




























































Figure 7: Fluctuations in selected business cycle and labour market variables in the US.
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